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2Numerous studies have investigated the use of base rates in
probabilistic reasoning. Early results of these studies suggested that
people generally ignore or neglect base rate probabilities. A famous
problem initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) was the
following:
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered
personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in
their respective fields. On the basis of this information,
thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have
been written. You will find on your forms a description, chosen
at random from the 100 available descriptions. For each
description, please indicate your probability that the person
described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100.
This information was followed by a personality description that presented
the stereotype of an engineer:
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children.
He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows
no interest in political and social issues and spends most of his
free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry,
sailing, and mathematical puzzles.
The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the
sample of 100 is ____%.
And this description was followed in turn by four other descriptions that
varied in their degree of representativeness (one of which, the null
description, was completely nondiagnostic between the Engineer and the
Lawyer stereotypes). These texts were submitted to one group of
participants (the low base rate group) whereas a second group of subjects
(the high base rate group) received identical texts except that the
proportion of engineers and lawyers, which defines the base rate, differed
(70 engineers vs. 30 lawyers). The aim of the study was to check the effect
of the two different base rates on the probability judgment by comparing
the evaluations given by the two experimental groups. The difference
should indicate how wide the use of the base rate was. The prediction
followed the representativeness hypothesis which posits that people
"select or order outcomes by the degree to which the outcomes represent
the essential features of the evidence" (Kahneman & Tversky, p. 237-238).
3A consequence of this hypothesis for the description above is that the
difference between the evaluations made by the two groups should be
very small, because the participants should mainly consider the
description that was identical for the two groups.
The answer considered normatively correct follows from Bayes's
theorem. Its statement in terms of odds shows that the ratio of the
posterior odds for the two groups depends on the base rate but is
independent of the likelihood ratio, so that it is the same for all
descriptions. Pooling across descriptions (except the null), the average of
the mean probability estimate for each participant was only slightly higher
for the high base rate group (55%) than for the low base rate group (50%).
The authors concluded that, as the representativeness hypothesis
predicted, the participants largely ignored base rates.
The concept of representativeness has been the target of much
criticism (Olson, 1976; Evans & Pollard, 1982; Gigerenzer, 1991;
Gigerenzer, Hell & Blank, 1988). It has been shown that the neglect of the
base rate lacks robustness (for a review see Koehler, 1996). This question
has been hotly debated (e.g. , Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Gigerenzer,
1996) and the standard experimental paradigm might be clarified by a
different approach. The present paper is devoted to such an approach.
The pragmatic approach to the psychology of thinking and
reasoning (Politzer, 1986;  Hilton, 1995;  Politzer & Macchi, 2000;
Politzer, in press a) has proved fruitful in various areas. It sheds new
light on classic tasks (see Macchi, 1995, for Kahneman & Tversky's cab
problem;  Dulany & Hilton, 1991,  Mosconi & Macchi, 2001,  Politzer &
Noveck, 1991, for the conjunction fallacy;  Politzer, in press b, for
conditional reasoning in context; Van der Henst, Rossi, & Schroyens,
2002, for Wason's 2-4-6 task);  it raises and solves new questions about
old paradigms (see Van der Henst, Sperber & Politzer, 2002, for
relational reasoning;  Mosconi, 1990, for problem solving at large);  it
even changes our understanding of some tasks altogether (see
Politzer, 1993, for the class inclusion question in children;  Sperber,
Cara, & Girotto, 1995, and Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber & Van der
Henst, 2001, for Wason's Selection Task). By the "pragmatic approach",
we do not refer to the mere acknowledgement of, or concern about,
the effects of context or of world knowledge: It is now widely agreed
4that such factors affect performance. Our view is more radical: We
believe that experimental tasks for which a normatively correct
response can be defined should be submitted to a double examination.
One, carried out at a micro-structure level, consists of a linguistic
analysis of the premises or of the problem statement in order to make
sure that they convey the meaning intended by the experimenter: A
typical outcome of such an analysis is the identification of different
possible interpretations due to the generation of conversational
implicatures (Grice, 1989), either particularized (that is, implicatures
generated in a specific context), or generalized (that is, implicatures
that  may accompany connectives or quantifiers). The other
examination, at a macro-structure level, consists of identifying the
representation of the task that participants are likely to build: A typical
outcome of this examination is the identification of the kind of skill,
knowledge, or ability that participants think they must exhibit in
order to satisfy the experimenter's request. This latter analysis takes a
serious view on the special relationship between experimenter and
participant (akin to the one between teacher and student in testing
situations); it is common knowledge that what is of interest to the
experimenter is not the informational content of the answer, but its
normative correctness. But what is of interest to the experimenter is
not always clear to the participant; the participant may engage in a
process of attribution whose outcome may be different from the
experimenter's expectations. If this occurs without being detected by
the experimenter, the participant's interpretation of the task will cause
the experimenter to misinterpret the results. In this paper, we argue
that such a misinterpretation is the case for the Lawyer-Engineer
problem. In the 'fifties and 'sixties, some social psychologists were
concerned about the demand characteristics of the task (Orne, 1969)
but unfortunately, with few exceptions, investigators of thinking and
reasoning have not paid enough attention to such worries. One
exception is due to some educational psychologists who have
introduced the notion of a didactic contract, that is, an implicit set of
rules based on mutual knowledge between teacher and pupils that
regulate the interpretation of the question and the type of responses
that are appropriate (see Schubauer-Leoni & Perret-Clermont 1997).
5Another notable exception is the work of Schwarz (1996) which
highlights the importance of the conversational approach and its
implications for the design of experiments. Norenzayam & Schwarz (1999)
asked participants to attribute reasons for a crime. One group was offered
cues to identify the experimenter as a social scientist, and the other group
as a personality psychologist. The first group gave more situational
attributions than dispositional attributions, whereas the second group
showed the reverse pattern. This result demonstrates the role of the
epistemic goals that the participants attribute to the experimenter.
Schwarz, Strack, Hilton & Naderer (1991) applied the same
approach to the Lawyer-Engineer problem. They presented the
psychological description either as a profile written by a psychologist or as
a piece of information formulated by a computer. The probability estimate
that the description was that of an engineer was higher in the former case
than in the latter, indicating that participants relied more on the
individuating information in the former case. According to the authors
these results show that the participants' use of information depends on the
communicative intention of the experimenter. While we agree with these
authors' conversational approach, their dependent variable - as in most
investigations of the problem - (the mean probability estimate) is not fully
satisfactory. It yields only indirect conclusions such as, "the higher
probability evaluation indicates greater use of individuating information"
without allowing the measurement of the size of the effect. Hence, if one
aims to show that pragmatic factors are the main determinants of
performance in this task, it is necessary to use a different method based on
a different dependent variable.
In this paper, we adopt the theoretical framework of Sperber &
Wilson's (1995) relevance theory. The Lawyer-Engineer problem has an
evident heterogeneous structure in that the base rate is in the form of a
percentage while the individuating information is in the form of a
description. Participants assume that the information provided to them is
relevant. Indeed, the processing of the description has cognitive effects at
a relatively low cost in terms of effort: It yields an estimate of typicality
that is necessary for solving the problem. This estimate shows the ability
of the participants to exploit a stereotype. Such an estimate, the
participants will suppose, is of interest to the experimenter, and so, by
6providing a numerical value that reflects their estimate of typicality, they
will be satisfied that they have fulfilled their task. Our hypothesis, in brief,
is that the participants take their task to be one in which they should infer
a typicality estimate based solely on the description.
Following our hypothesis, it should be possible to alter
performance by designing a situation in which participants would receive
equivalent individuating information but without inferring it themselves.
For example, if they were provided with just an evaluation of typicality
without a psychological description, participants should correctly view the
task as mathematical, which would lead them to use the numerical
information available in combination with the indicated typicality. In the
usual condition, however, many participants stop their reflection after
they have worked out a typicality value of their own because, as claimed




Materials and design. Each participant received a form that
contained the problem statement followed by the usual request to indicate
the probability that the file under consideration was that of one of the
engineers.
Four kinds of forms were prepared, defining four conditions (three
controls and one experimental condition). For all conditions, the base rate
was defined by the same ratio: 30% of engineers and 70% of lawyers. The
four conditions were the following (see the Appendix).
- the Diagnostic description condition (a) presented a translation and
adaptation of Kahneman & Tversky's original problem.
- the Nondiagnostic description condition (b), is a control presenting a
psychological description that could fit various professions and was
nondiagnostic between the engineer and the lawyer stereotypes.
There were two novel conditions:
- the No description + Statement of Typicality  condition (c) repeated the story
about the panel of psychologists making evaluations and about choosing
files randomly, but did not present any psychological description. In its
7place, it contained this statement: "The description is typical of an
engineer".
- the Diagnostic description + Statement of Typicality  condition (d) was a
combination of the standard condition (a) and of the crucial statement
used in condition (c);  in other words, it presented both the statement, "the
description is typical of an engineer" and the psychological description. It
was used as a control for the comparison between conditions (a) and (c).
(The authors are indebted to Phil Johnson-Laird for suggesting this
condition).
Predictions. The probability estimates should not only reflect the
relative extent to which participants rely on the individuating information.
As noted above, they should also indicate an absolute measure of this
extent. An objective and accurate measure can be obtained in the case
where the individuating information is totally disregarded in favor of the
base rate, in which case the participants give the proportion of engineers
(30%) as their answer. Conversely, this answer indicates that the
participant is sensitive to the base rate exclusively. We chose a value
commonly used in other studies. Likewise, the choice of 30% was
motivated by the fact that an answer equal to .30 can unambiguously be
attributed to the exclusive use of the base rate because a high probability
estimate derived from the typical description is unlikely to yield the .30
value. This would not be the case with the 70% value (or any value higher
than 50%).
Assuming that the only two sources of information for participants
to work out their response are the base rate and the individuating
information, when a response differs from .30 it can be inferred that the
individuating information has been taken into account at least to some
extent. In brief, the dependent variable, which will be called r, is the
frequency of exact reproduction of the base rate. Readers might object
that an estimate of 50% does not indicate a non-exclusive use of base rate
but rather a "don't know" response. But the results of a pilot study in
which participants were asked to justify their answers indicated that an
estimate of 50% was a numerical way to express uncertainty based on a
lack of cues.
The following predictions were made:
8(i) The value of r should be lower with (a) (Diagnostic description)
than with (b) (Nondiagnostic description), that is, there should be a greater
use of the description in (a) than in (b). This prediction follows from the
fact that the description is more relevant in (a) than in (b), i.e., the
diagnostic description suggests the stereotype of one of the two
professions. The use of this description yields an estimate of typicality and
justifies the presumption of its relevance. In contrast, the nondiagnostic
description is not the source of an estimate of typicality, which could be
used as a basis for answering the question: It is less relevant in the
technical sense, that is, few, if any, inferences  can be made from it. 
(ii) The value of r should not differ between (a) (Diagnostic
description) and (d) (Diagnostic description + Statement of Typicality. In both
conditions, the description is relevant because it enables one to make an
inference: Producing  an inference in condition (a) and  verifying an
inference in condition (d). The difference is that, in the latter condition, the
description is  information attesting to the reasonableness of the judgment
of typicality. The inference is directed by given information. But, in the
former condition, no such direction is provided: The description is
information from which a judgment of typicality has to be inferred.
Hence, in both cases, the description is roughly equally relevant because
the participant makes use of it either to produce an inference or to make a
verification. The values of r should accordingly be comparable in both
conditions.
(iii) The main prediction is that the conditions that present a
diagnostic description ( (a) and (d) ) will elicit a greater  use of the
individuating information (and therefore a less exclusive use of the base
rate) than condition (c) (No description + Statement of Typicality). This is
because in the conditions with a description, participants may suppose that
the essence of their task is to infer a typicality value. If so, they will tend to
focus on this value, which represents the end of the task (and
consequently overlook the base rate). In contrast, the experimental
condition contains no individuating information for participants to work
out a typicality estimate. They cannot view the task as calling for such an
estimate. They  should represent the task as closer to a mathematical
exercise than to a request for displaying their psychological skills, and
consequently they will tend to look for numerical information. Also, this
9condition is crucial to distinguish the relevance explanation from the
typicality explanation. From the relevance point of view, a typicality value
worked out from a description is not equivalent to one that is passively
read. Only in the former case does the high degree of typicality render the
description relevant for the task, which should be represented as an
assessment of the typicality of the description. In the experimental
condition, the task has a different representation, as the typicality value is
given: The typicality description is relevant for estimating the probability
that an engineer is in the sample. In contrast, for the typicality approach,
the two conditions (with or without an explicit statement) are just two
alternative ways of giving the same final information to the effect that the
typicality value is high.
Participants and procedure. Participants were 113 undergraduate
students of Psychology at the University Bicocca in Milan. Each of them
was randomly allocated to one of the four conditions.
Results
Table 1 indicates the frequency of responses equal to the base rate
for each condition. The No description + Statement  condition  (c)  yielded
more productions of the base rate, that is, less use of the individuating
information, than the Diagnostic description condition (a) (chi-square = 29.9,
p <.001),  and also than the Diagnostic description + Statement condition (d),
(chi-square = 16.2 , p <.001). In addition, the results corroborated the
prediction that the Diagnostic description condition (a) would give rise to
more use of individuating information than the Nondiagnostic description
condition (b) (chi-square = 8.58, p <.01). Likewise, as we predicted,
performance with the Diagnostic description (a) and with the Diagnostic
description + Statement (d) did not differ significantly.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In brief, the main prediction was confirmed: Participants who
received the individuating information indirectly in the form of a
psychological description (the standard Diagnostic description condition (a))
from which they had to infer a judgment of typicality used this
information more often than those who received it in the form of an
explicit statement of typicality (in the No description + Statement condition
(c) ). This result is paradoxical: One would expect the information that is
less explicit and harder to exploit to be used less frequently, so that after
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the description, participants would use it less often (because  the typicality
must be inferred) than those to whom this information is explicitly offered
in a direct statement. The contrary occurred, and our theoretical approach
explains why: When they are presented with a psychological description,
participants' representation of the task is that of a test of their own ability
to identify the psychological features of a description that can distinguish
an engineer from a lawyer. They are consequently diverted from making
use of the other sources of information such as the base rate which
belongs to a task which is a mathematical exercise: The representation of
the two kinds of task are alien to each other.
Readers might object that the less frequent use of individuating
information in the No description + Statement condition as compared to the
Diagnostic description condition could be attributed to the presence of the
typicality statement rather than to the absence of a description. But, on the
one hand, it is hard to see how a statement of typicality could decrease the
use of individuating information: If it had any effect in isolation, it could
only increase it. And, on the other hand, the absence of a significant
difference between the Diagnostic description and the Diagnostic description
+ Statement conditions indicates that the presence of the typicality
statement had no effect of its own.
One result is at variance with the results originally reported by
Kahneman &Tversky (1973) and replicated in other studies (e. g. ,
Gigerenzer, & al., 1988) concerning the nondiagnostic descriptions. These
studies found that exactly the same median estimate was given by the
groups that had different base rates (30-70 and 70-30) and they took this
observation as evidence that the base rates are totally disregarded. But
this is a very coarse indicator that conceals the distribution of the
participants' answers. The value of the median is compatible with  the
earlier interpretation, but there is another interpretation that is at least as
likely: The same median value was observed because participants have
used the base rate in the same manner (not  because they did not use it). A
possible source for the discrepancy with our results (in which the exclusive
use of the base rate for the nondiagnostic condition was 54%) could be the
difference in the procedure: Our participants received only one description
whereas in the standard procedure participants received the nondiagnostic
description mixed with diagnostic ones. The results of a number of studies
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(in Ginossar & Trope, 1987, 1987; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) point to the
existence of order effects. They support the view (equally endorsed by
Bar-Hillel, 1983) that Kahneman & Tversky's (1973) result for the
nondiagnostic description was due to the repeated measures design that
they used, so that participants focused their attention on the descriptions
that varied across problems. Likewise, Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein
(1979) showed that when the base rate is varied within-subjects instead of
the description performance reflected the base rates.
General Discussion
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the experiment. They
concern the relevance-based explanation of performance, the integration
of information, and the representativeness explanation. We take up these
issues in turn.
Relevance and alternative explanations
Our first conclusion is that the use of the base rate depends on how
the task is mentally represented, which in turn depends on considerations
of relevance. Knowledge of the typicality of the psychological description
is exploited only to the extent that participants consider it to be relevant.
About three quarters of the participants (in the Diagnostic description and
Diagnostic description + Statement conditions) took the diagnostic
information into account when they had to extract it from a typical
description. However, when the diagnostic information was condensed in
the form of a verbal statement (No description + Statement condition), only
15% of the participants took it into account. The percentage was
intermediate (about 50%) for those who were presented with the
nondiagnostic description (suggesting that up to one half of this latter
group assumed it was diagnostic in order to render it relevant). These
results extend the observations made by Schwarz & al. (1991). While the
size of the effect of the manipulation reported by these authors cannot be
assessed,  the present experiment  reveals a shift of about two thirds of the
population in the use of individuating information between the two critical
conditions, namely the Diagnostic description and the No description +
Statement conditions.
Is there an alternative explanation of the performance in the
experimental group?  It may be tempting to attribute the results to the
difference in salience of the individuating information between the
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conditions with a description and the No description + Statement condition.
There are two reasons to reject this hypothesis. First, in order to
accommodate all the results, the salience hypothesis should also explain
why most participants apparently disregarded the statement in the No
description + Statement  condition. An explanation in terms of a lack of
salience seems highly implausible because it implies that nearly all
participants presented with the two sentences, "A description has been
chosen at random from the 100 available descriptions. The psychological
description is typical of an engineer", systematically overlooked the
second sentence. Rather, we believe that participants did process the
second sentence, but in the end discarded it because its content makes the
problem question irrelevant. In effect, participants are facing a request to
express numerically the probability that a typical description of an
engineer is that of an engineer. For those who understand the difference
between likelihood and posterior probability, the question is trivial
(although awkward to answer numerically). For those who mix up these
concepts, the question contains the answer: In both cases, the problem
question lacks relevance. In such a situation, participants will try to
reinterpret the question. The most relevant way (which follows a least
effort path to producing an answer) is to exploit any other cue provided
by the experimenter: The base rate is the most conspicuous piece of
information to use. The second and more important reason why the
salience hypothesis fails is that it does not make a distinction between the
diagnostic (salient) information and the typicality estimate. The diagnostic
information, whether it is salient or not, is not the basis for the final
probability estimate. The probability estimate is inferred from the
typicality estimate, which acts as a mediator between the diagnostic
information (whatever its degree of salience may be) and the probability
estimate.
There is an alternative version of the salience hypothesis that does
take into account the distinction between diagnostic information and
typicality estimate. It claims that participants who have paid attention to
salient information will attach greater importance to the subsequent
typicality estimate. But this claim is just an imprecise and pre-theoretical
version of the relevance explanation which says that the description
carries with it a presumption of relevance, that is, a guarantee for the
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reader that it is worth processing the description in order to infer new
information (or in the present case, in order to arrive at the solution). So,
not only does the relevance approach have much to say about the task, it
also explains the effect of information salience.
Another possible explanation of the results is based on the notion
of vividness: The Diagnostic description presented information that is vivid,
concrete and specific, whereas the No description condition presented
pallid, abstract and general information. The salience hypothesis concerns
the focusing of attention. But the difference in vividness concerns the
subjective weight of the information, which should be greater when there
is a description than when there is no description. There are two
consequences. First, up to here the analysis of the evidence could result in
a degree of belief in the typicality of the description that is greater in the
description conditions than in the No description condition. But it is not sure
at all that a belief inferred by the participant's own consideration of the
information should be greater than the belief in a statement provided by
the experimenter: one could claim quite the contrary. Second, the
typicality estimate itself would be higher; for instance, participants in the
description conditions would infer a belief that the description is highly
typical, while those in the No description conditions were just told that "the
description is typical". But it is very doubtful that a necessarily limited
difference of this sort (given that "typical" is linguistically marked) could
account for the sharp difference in performance that was found. Finally, if
the vividness hypothesis has something to say about the belief in the
typicality of the description, it cannot explain, contrary to the relevance
explanation, performance in the No description condition for the same
reasons that the salience hypothesis fails: The statement must be
processed, unless it is passed unnoticed, which is very implausible.
Integration of information
 The second conclusion has two facets, one of which sheds new light
on an old paradigm. On the one hand, in the pilot study referred to
earlier, in which  justifications were asked (and that was otherwise nearly
identical to the present experiment), the analysis indicates that nearly all
the responses that differ from the base rate (that is, responses that take
the individuating information into account) were justified without any
reference to the base rate: This confirms the base rate neglect but our
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explanation of it differs sharply from the heuristic explanation. In our
view, the neglect does not imply an intrinsic bias, but an effect of the
interpretation of what the task is about; actually, the base rate is widely
considered when the participants are not diverted from the objective of
the task as is the case in the standard problem. On the other hand, the
experiment has revealed a symmetrical effect that seems to have passed
unnoticed so far. In effect, the proportion of responses equal to the base
rate, that is, the proportion of responses showing disregard of the
individuating information, is surprisingly high. In the two conditions that
had a diagnostic description (with or without the statement of typicality)
the proportion of responses equal to the base rate reached about one
quarter of the responses, even though the description instantiated the
social stereotype. In the pilot study in which a justification was asked,
about three quarters of the estimates equal to the base rate were justified
by a mention of the proportion of engineers (or by an appeal to a
procedure of computation), that is, without any reference to the
individuating information which, it is reminded, was always present either
in the form of a description, or in the form of a statement of typicality, or
both. In other words, the present manipulation has revealed a mirror
effect to the neglect of the base rate, namely the neglect of the
individuating information. We claim that this occurs because the
individuating information becomes irrelevant when it is realized that it
looks like a direct answer to the question. There is a slight asymmetry
between the two cases: In one case, the base rate is considered irrelevant
because participants think that they have fulfilled the task; in the other
case, the individuating information is considered irrelevant because if it
were taken into consideration, there would be no task to fulfill. Upon
being told that the description is typical, participants infer a probability
estimate commensurate with the value verbally provided to them. But
then, this too easy inference looks very much like an answer to the
question, which makes it lack relevance. Except for those who were
sophisticated enough to try to combine this qualitative information with
the quantitative one, they reinterpreted the question as a request for an
unconditioned probability, which enabled them to render the base rate
information relevant and to fulfill the task, so that they gave the base rate
as their response.
15
The notion that information should be perceived as relevant in
order to be used has already been considered to explain base rate neglect
(Bar-Hillel, 1980; Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990). In our opinion, this notion
applies to the individuating information as well. The present investigation
contributes to redress the balance in a paradigm traditionally considered
from a single point of view, demonstrating both the neglect of the base
rate and the neglect of the individuating information.
We believe that these neglects are the two sides of the same coin:
They reflect the lack of integration of two disconnected sources of
information. The individuating information is qualitative and actively
extracted because covertly provided. The base rate information is
quantitative and passively exploited because overtly provided. The one or
the other neglect occurs depending on the task representation, that is,
presumed relevance. In the original problem, the emphasis is put on the
description to exploit, so that participants interpret the task as a request to
act as a psychologist and once they have extracted the individuating
information and inferred a typicality estimate, the implicit contract by
which they are linked with the experimenter has been fulfilled. Further
information, especially mathematical, is irrelevant, both in the intuitive
and theoretical senses. Similarly, in the new version of the problem
introduced here, which resembles a mathematical problem, the statement
of typicality provided to participants looks like an answer to the question,
which would break the same contract if it were taken into consideration;
they consider it as irrelevant, and fall back to the numerical information
(the base rate) which, in their turn, they fail to combine with the other
source of information.
The notion that there is a lack of integration of different sources of
information is not new. Ginossar & Trope (1987) obtained increased use of
base rate when the base rate value and the description were integrated
and presented in the form of a list. But their data, based on the traditional
dependent variable (the mean probability estimate) do not indicate which
proportion of participants was affected by the manipulation. Kahneman
and Tversky (1973, p. 243) themselves commented on the lack of
integration:
 Our subjects, however, failed to integrate prior probability
with specific evidence. [. . .] The failure to appreciate the
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relevance of prior probability in the presence of specific
evidence is perhaps one of the most significant departures of
intuition from the normative theory of prediction.
We concur with this quote; but whereas its authors just made a correct
description using the pre-theoretical term of relevance, we have offered an
explanation for this observation using the same term in its technical,
theoretical sense.
Representativeness
Could representativeness account for the difference in performance
between participants in the No description + Statement  condition and those
in the Diagnostic description condition? If the operation of the
representativeness heuristic consists in the "assessment of the degree of
correspondence between [. . .] an outcome and a model" (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983, p. 295), performance in the No description + Statement
condition clearly contradicts this view. All the participants in this condition
were provided with an explicit statement of strong correspondence
between the outcome and the model. Therefore all of them should have
opted for a high probability and in particular none of them should have
given an answer equal to .30. Of course, one might object that there is a
difference between (i) basing the judgment of correspondence with the
model on a synthetic statement that provides the assessment ready made
(as was necessarily the case in the No description + Statement condition if
representativeness is to be used) and, (ii) working out the degree of
correspondence by considering the various diagnostic features. In this
view, representativeness would require to actively work out the final
judgment of similarity, and would be blocked otherwise. But it is not quite
clear why. Furthermore, this is close to our main claim that need no
representativeness hypothesis: People who have been active in exploiting
the description do not feel the need to use extra information.
There are further reasons which render the representativeness
explanation inadequate. As we have shown, it cannot explain the neglect
of the individuating information: The representativeness  explanation is
incomplete and not parsimonious. More seriously it begs the question
because in order to solve the Lawyer-Engineer problem, it is necessary to
make a comparison between the description and the stereotype: The most
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serious conceptual flaw in this approach is the use of the description of a
necessary step in the resolution of the problem as an explanatory concept.
A tentative outlook of how people solve the problem.
We will propose an overview of how participants process the
problem; although it has not been directly tested, the results are
compatible with the idea that solving the standard problem requires a
two-step process.
Step one requires to decide to which extent the set of features is
characteristic of an engineer. It results in a degree of typicality, which all
participants can arrive at. Step two consists in answering the question
proper, that is, given the degree of fit to the stereotype worked out at
step one, what is the probability that the description is that of an
engineer?  Once participants have arrived at a high estimate of typicality
(step one), the question can receive two different interpretations.
(i) The high typicality value suggests that the description is that of
an engineer, in other words the question seems to have been answered;
participants stop on the way and the typicality value is taken to be the
final response. This is possible because participants feel that, in exploiting
the description, they have fulfilled the task requirement and satisfied the
presumption of relevance of the description. The base rate neglect reflects
a lack of interest for further information that is viewed as irrelevant.
Notice that once the response is given, step one can be described in terms
of the representativeness heuristic since the response is based on the
working out of a typicality estimate. But we believe that this step is a
necessary (and insufficient) step on the way to the solution, the bias which
consists in, and is explained by, stopping at this step being artificially
induced by the task representation.
(ii) The question amounts to asking what is the probability that a
description typical of an engineer is that of an engineer: It is viewed as
pointless or tautological. But the question can be normalized into "What is
the probability to draw the description of an engineer". Participants
readily find an answer in the base rate which has not been used, and this
satisfies the presumption of its relevance. They make an exclusive use of
the base rate, failing to integrate the two sources of information. Again
their lack of interest for one of the sources of information (the
individuating information) stems from its apparent irrelevance. The classic
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control problem (the non-diagnostic description) leads, after step one, to
the absence of a typicality value. This cannot provide the basis for an
answer and participants interpret the question as "What is the probability
that the description is that of an engineer" based on no other information
than the base rate. The problem in the present No description condition
leads participants to step two directly and to the second interpretation of
the question.
Of course, the lack of integration of the two sources of information
that results from task representation depends on an inherent difficulty in
integrating them. Participants untutored in probability theory have
difficulty to cope with problems that require probabilistic revision:
Performance on less deceptive tasks is not perfect, even after the defects in
their formulation have been corrected (Macchi, 1995, 2000). One can only
regret that so much research has been devoted to a task that artificially
enhances a difficulty, the origin of which could be studied better by trying
to control it, for instance by drawing, to various degrees, participants'
attention to the necessity of combining the information.
Our theoretical approach is based on the notion of task
representation. This notion hinges upon processes of attribution made by
the participant to the experimenter, which is but a specific example of the
effects of social factors on thinking and reasoning. In view of Paolo
Legrenzi's long standing interest and contribution to that stream of
research, we are happy to dedicate the present work to him.
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Table 1.  Percentage of responses equal to the base rate for each
condition and level of significance of the differences in frequency.
                            statement of typicality                          .
present (novel condition) absent
            description                                                       description                 .
none (c)        diagnostic (d)                nondiagnostic (b)       diagnostic (a)
(N = 26)       (N = 29)    (N = 28)  (N = 30)
   .85 .31        .54       .17
     <. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p <. 001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . >
     <. . . . p <. 001 . . . .>
<. . . . . p <. 01 . . . . . . . >
       <. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>
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Appendix
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality
tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields.
On the basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30
engineers and 70 lawyers have been written.
Condition (a): Diagnostic description
You will find below a description, chosen at random from the 100
available descriptions. Read this description and indicate your
probability that the person described is an engineer.
Paolo is a 45 years old man. He is married and has two children.
He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He does
not care very much about his look. He shows no interest in
political and social issues and he is addicted to his computer. He
designed his Hi-Fi set himself. He spends most of his free time
on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing,
and mathematical puzzles.
The probability that the description is that of an engineer is ____
 (indicate a numerical value).
 Condition (b): Nondiagnostic description  (control).
Andrea is a 30 years old man. He is married with no children. A
man of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be
quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.
Condition (c): No description + Statement of Typicality.
A description has been chosen at random from the 100 available
descriptions. The psychological description is typical of an engineer.
 Indicate your probability that the person described is an engineer.
Condition (d): Diagnostic description + Statement of Typicality (control).
You will find below a u, chosen at random from the 100 available
descriptions. The psychological description is typical of an engineer,
as you can see. Indicate your probability that the person described is
an engineer. [description follows like in condition (a)].
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